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Honorable Timothy Hanson 
District Court Judge 
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Utah Supreme Court 
No. 860007 
(Argument Priority No. 14) 
This is the Reply Brief of James Hornsby (hereinafter 
"Hornsby" or plaintiff) to the briefs of Respondents Corporation 
of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints and Charles Giblett (hereinafter collectively 
referred to as nLDS Church" or defendants) and Respondents John 
and Mary Sutton (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Sutton" 
or defendants). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
REFUSING TO VOIR DIRE THE JURY ON MATTERS 
INVOLVING THEIR POTENTIAL PREJUDICIAL INVOLVE-
MENT WITH THE DEFENDANT LDS CHURCH. 
Plaintiff has not misinterpreted Casey v. Roman Catholic,Arch 
Bishop of BaliilDSIfir 143 A.2d 627 (Md. 1958) as claimed by 
defendant LDS Church. Defendants spot reference the case omitting 
a critical segment of the case which states specifically that "the 
parties are entitled to ferret out, or preferably have the court 
discover for them, the existence of bias or prejudice resulting 
from such (religious) affiliation,n In the instant case, the 
trial courtfs error was not only in refusing plaintiff's proposed 
voir dire, but in refusing a continued examination of each juror 
on the nature of their elicited responses. If any of the juror's 
responses then indicated specific cause for disqualification, 
counsel would have proposed further inquiry into that bias or 
prejudice elicited. Plaintiff does not contend, as asserted 
by LDS Church, that the mere holding of an office in the LDS 
Church or church membership is sufficient to establish bias. 
However, such information would provide a touch stone for counsel 
to further inquire to ferret out bias or prejudice related to such 
positions. 
Defendant LDS Church incorrectly states that plaintiff cites 
State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Ut. 1984), as "holding" that 
religious affiliation must be inquired into in order to provide 
information necessary to the intelligent exercise of peremptory 
challenges. The case was cited for the reasoning and authorities 
cited by the court in arriving at its holding. Asking the 
prospective jurors if they abstained from drinking alcohol for 
religious reasons is essentially asking them what religion they 
are because a very limited number of religions actually prohibit 
the consumption of alcohol. In relying on the Supreme Court in 
Swain vs. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824 (1965) the Ball 
court stated: 
. . . Hence the Veniremen . . . are 
challenged in light of the limited knowledge 
counsel has on themf which may include their 
group affiliations, in the context of the case 
to be tried* 
POINT II 
IT WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR TO ALLOW DEFENSE 
COUNSEL TO REFER TO HIS CLIENT AS THE WELFARE 
FARM. 
Defense counsel's reference to his client as the "welfare 
farm11 introduced an undesirable element of unfair prejudice into 
the trial. Not only is that entity associated with the LDS 
Church, but the word "welfare" stirs up images of poverty which 
might preclude a jury from finding against such a defendant. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL JUDGE COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
REFUSING TO GIVE PLAINTIFFfS REQUESTED JURY 
INSTRUCTION ON RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
Both defendants LDS Church and Sutton cites several cases in 
support of their contention that the trial judge properly refused 
to give a res ipsa loquitur instruction. In the cases relied on 
by both defendants, the courts emphasized that the plaintiffs 
presented jig evidence of defendants1 negligence and, therefore, 
res ipsa loguitax was inapplicable. In the instant case, 
plaintiff presented evidence that a gate was left open, that 
inadequate equipment was used and that defendants were negligent 
in several other ways. 
Rhiness vs. Dansie, 472 P.2d 428 (Ut 1970) , cited by defend-
ant LDS Church, is clearly distinguishable from the case herein 
because in Rhiness there were no facts to explain how the animals 
escaped. The Rhiness case does not render the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur inapplicable in this state, but merely states it 
should not apply where there is a total lack of evidence regarding 
the animal's escape. As stated in defendant LDS Churchfs Brief, 
the Rhiness court held that: " . . . the mere fs£i that the 
animals escaped from the enclosure is not sufficient evidence 
standing alone, to justify this submission of defendant's 
negligence to the jury." Id. at 430. (Emphasis added.) 
Respondent LDS Church goes on to state in the same paragraph 
that Watzig v. Tobin, 642 P.2d 651 (Or. 1952) is distinguish-
able because, in that case, "the evidence did not establish how 
the cow had escaped that enclosure." Defendants erroneously 
state, in the instant case, the escape of the cow was clearly 
established by the testimony. However, this is untrue. Each of 
the defendants' witnesses had a different version of how the cow 
escaped. John Sutton didn't know what exactly happened to the 
wire (which held the gate to the trailer) when the cow broke loose 
and took off, because he took off with it, and when he came back 
the truck had been moved. He didn't even remember if he had 
hooked the trailer to the gate. (R. 591.) 
Each of the following cases cited by respondent LDS church on 
the issue of res ipsa loquitur can be distinguished from the case 
at hand in that in each of these cases there was no evidence to 
substantiate submitting the issue of res ipsa loquitur to the 
jury. Brauner v. Peterson, 16 Wash. App. 531f 557 P.2d 359 
(1976); Tapia y_._McKenzie, 85 N.M. 567, 514 P.2d 618 (1973); 
Barnes v. Frank, 472 P.2d 745 (Ct. of App. Col. 1970); fieed 
v. Molnar, 423 N.E. 2d 140 (Oh. 1981). 
The Brauner court refused to draw an inference and apply the 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine because the defendants rested their 
case without producing any evidence to explain how the cows got 
loose and onto the highway. In Rgnfrp,v„ J.D^. Coggins CQ^ , 378 
P.2d 130 (Co. 1963), cited by the Tapia court, the court held 
that the doctrine cannot apply unless there is something more 
than surmise or speculation to connect the exercise of control 
with the subsequent injury." There was simply no evidence 
presented in these cases as to the cause of the accident. 
Similarly, the Barnes court stated " . . . the fact that the 
cattle were on the highway does not in and pf_ itself make 
defendant liable or raise a presumption of negligence against a 
defendant. The cattle may have entered on the highway because of 
a number of factors, including possible acts of third persons." 
In the case at hand, plaintiffs carefully considered all factors 
leading to the escape, and every witness involved appeared and 
testified at the trial. No "third persons" had access to the cow. 
In Reed y^BfllUAXr 4 2 3 N-E* 2d 1 4 0 (°h* 1981), cited by 
defendant LDS Church, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not 
apply because plaintiff failed to produce any evidence to satisfy 
the elements of res ipsa loquitur. For the above stated reasons, 
that case is inapplicable. 
Defendants Sutton also cite several cases where res ipsa 
loquitur was held inapplicable due to the lack of any evidence of 
the defendants negligence. 
Sutton cites Kusy v. K-Mart Appare_l__Corporation, 681 P.2d 
1232 (Ut. 1984) to argue that Hornsby failed to show that "the 
accident was of a kind which, in the ordinary course of events, 
would not have happened had due care been observed." Sutton then 
goes on to argue that perhaps plaintiff was negligent. Sutton's 
speculation on Hornsby's negligence is neither well taken nor 
applicable to the res ipsa loquitur argument. The reasonably 
prudent person does not necessarily consider the possibility that 
a cow would dart in front of him/her while he/she was driving down 
a road. Furthermoref this speculation does not explain how 
Hornsby failed to show that this accident "was of a kind which in 
the ordinary course of eventsr would not have happened had due 
care been observed." The fact is, cows are not normally found on 
public highways. They do not normally escape in the absence of 
negligence. Moreover, plaintiff, at trial, brought out several 
facts regarding the defendants1 negligence. The upper gate was 
left open. Inadequate equipment was utilized. Certainly, Hornsby 
made out the prima face case required by Kusy. 
Defendants Sutton next cite Denver R+G* B.t, £Q* „ y* _ Ash t on-
Whyte-SkillconLCp^, 162 P.83 (Ut. 1916) for the proposition that 
plaintiff did not meet the second prerequisite for res ipsa 
loquitur—that the agency or instrumentality was within defend-
ants1 exclusive control. Defendants were caretakers and owners of 
the cow. To argue, as defendants Sutton do, that the cow was not 
v * » r c i r i t i i i l o l dp t vm Ian! t nn t I In f imc n l t h e 
accident i.- * -. a-que that a barrel of flour falling from a window 
left the defendants1 control when it left the window and, there-
fore
 r i:es_... ipsa loquitur i s not applicabl e. Denver 
R.G,R,_Co,_y_«_AshtonrWhytgrSkil 1 coin Cp_«, supra, Involved two 
railroad cars which
 e s c ap e c3 from defendantf s si di ng caiis i ng 
property damage. Defendant had placed those cars on t :he siding 
two days pri or to thei r "escape". The court, in determining that 
a res ipsa loguitu r i i 1 s11: n icti oi i was i naj: »propr:i at e j: « ::»:i nted oi 11 t 1 at : 
persons other than defendant carrier had access to the cars during 
this period. - **> nstant case, the - escaped while defend-
the cow escaped. 
Zampos v. United States Smelting^_Refining and_,Mining Co. , 
Mlh V.'Jd l i ' i tl'ibrii r 11 , I^M) invo lved damage caused bv * f lonf l . 
Again the court denied the applicability of res ipsa loquitur 
because there was no evidence of defendant1- •--' . -"-w ' •* 
Zampos language quoted by defendant is out of context Th»- c^.rt 
went: on to state: 
The mining property in question was in the 
exclusive custody and control of the defend-
ant. But, there was a complete absence of any 
showing that the flood was of a character 
which ordinarily does not occur in the absence 
of negligence. The circumstances disclosed 
were equally consistent with a cause not 
attributable to negligence on the part of the 
defendant. The facts were not sufficient to 
sustain an inference that the defendant was 
negligent either in storing the water on its 
premises or knowingly permitting it to 
accumulate therer or that it accumulated there 
under circumstances with which the defendant 
in the exercise of ordinary care should have 
been familiar. 
Id. at 177. 
In the instant cases there was evidence of defendants1 
negligence. Moreover that negligence is the only explanation for 
the cowfs presence on the highway. This circumstance is not 
"equally consistent with a cause which would not be attributable 
to negligence." 
In both Wightman_ J._Mgunt_ain Fuel^Supply Co., 302 P. 2d 471 
(Ut. 1956), and Jens on _v. S _. H_.... Kress, &_ Co^ , 49 P.2d 958 (Ut. 1935) 
there was no evidence of defendants' negligence. Those cases are 
likewise not dispositive of the instant case where such evidence 
exists. 
Finally, defendants Sutton cite Poole _v^ _GilliBOBf 15 
F.R.D. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1953). Again, the Poole court denied the 
res ipsa Ipgyitm instruction because there was no evidence of 
defendants1 negligence. The mules involved escaped at night while 
defendants slept. The court pointed out that "there is no 
evidence that the gate to the enclosure was left open, or that the 
fence was inadequate or that it was weak or in ill repair, or 
constructed in an inferior manner or of inferior materials . . . " 
Id. at 198. This is exactly the type of evidence which plaintiff 
in the instant case did introduce at trial. The Poole court went 
so far as to defer their ruling so that plaintiff's counsel might 
obtain evidence of such negligence. In the instant case, that 
evidence was presented at trial. 
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CONCLUSION 
The tria ] i n t:*^ ;• ; • - - conducted in an atmosphere of 
pteiudice leciil tina f,. :• .... ,e:;.:,! reversible errors. Appellant 
respectfully requests thi:- <" n < reverse the judgment and 
remand this case wxui • rropriat- . "isttactions to the trial court 
so that appellant mav be ntforded a rair I T I A I , 
DATED this J L day of Ocj~ -. 1986. 
BLACK & MOORE 
/3/ 
Lry AT Rudolph Mar .
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